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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark Whitman appeals from the judgment of conviction following his conditional
guilty pleas after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. Mr. Whitman
asserts that the district court erred when it denied h1s motion to suppress evidence
found during a warrantless search of his vehicle because the State failed to establish an
exception to the warrant requirement.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At between 6:30 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. on December 27, 2008, Idaho State Trooper
Bailey observed a Suburban leave a gas station pulling a trailer that did not have a
license plate and did not have its tail lights activated.

He initiated a traffic stop and

identified Mr. Whitman as the driver. Trooper Bailey believed that he had seen another
person driving the vehicle in the gas station parking lot, so he asked Mr. Whitman if
there was anyone else in the vehicle.

Mr. Whitman, who paused before answering,

"said he was the only person inside the vehicle." Trooper Bailey then noticed a bullet in
the middle console, and asked if there were any firearms inside the vehicle, to which
Mr. Whitman replied "no there was not." (Supp.Tr., 1 p.18, L.15

p.23, L.5.)

Suspicious about both of Mr. Whitman's responses, Trooper Bailey then scanned
the interior of the vehicle, at which point he noticed "some brown hair sticking out of a

1

Three volumes of transcripts were prepared on appeal. One transcript volume,
covering the suppression hearing, was prepared as a supplemental transcript. For ease
of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Supp.Tr." Another transcript volume
includes a hearing on a motion to reset the motion to suppress hearing and the
sentencing hearing. For ease of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Sent.Tr."
The third transcript volume contains the hearing on Mr. Whitman's conditional guilty
plea. For ease of reference, appellate counsel will cite to it as "Plea.Tr."
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blanket in the rear compartment of the [S]uburban." At that point, Trooper Bailey "gave
loud clear commands for the individual to show his hands and present himself to me."
The man, identified as Michael Maddox, was asked to sit in the front passenger seat
while Trooper Bailey ran checks on both Mr. Whitman and Mr. Maddox. The check
revealed that Mr. Maddox had multiple warrants, and he was taken into custody at
gunpoint with the assistance of the Elmore County Sheriff's Department. Mr. Whitman
was then removed from the car, patted down for weapons, and detained. (Supp.Tr.,
p.23, L.6 - p.29, L.1.)
Trooper Bailey, assisted by Deputy Sterling, searched the Suburban. During the
search, they discovered a brown briefcase containing a loaded handgun, a plastic bag
with a white crystal residue, and a scale. Under the rear seats, they discovered two
other handguns, one of which was loaded. Finally, in a black leather jacket in the rear
compartment, they discovered a glass pipe. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.18 - p.33, L.8.)
As a result of the traffic stop and the items found within the vehicle, Mr. Whitman
was charged with aiding and abetting grand theft by receiving or possessing stolen
property

(one

of

the

handguns),

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine), resisting or obstructing officers (for lying about being alone in the
vehicle), and possession of paraphernalia (for a butane torch and the scale).
(R., pp.17-19.)

Defense counsel then filed a motion to suppress, in which he asserted that the
recently-issued case of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009),
prohibited the type of search conducted by the police in his case. 2 (R., pp.24-26.)

2

Although defense counsel mentioned the Idaho Constitution in the motion, he did not
quote Article I, § 17, or assert why or how that provision provides greater protection
2

Neither the parties nor the district court had the guidance of the Supreme Court's later
decision in Davis v. United States,_ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), in which the
Court declined to exclude evidence found in violation of Gant to a search conducted
before it was issued when such a search was "conducted in reasonable reliance on
binding precedent[.]" Davis at

131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.

In opposing Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress, the State argued, inter alia, that
the search of the vehicle was "justified as a protective Terry 3 frisk of the vehicle[,]" and
that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.

(R., pp.38-48; 64-66.)

Ultimately, the district court denied Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress based on Ganfs
exception for purposes of finding evidence relevant to the offense of arrest and under
the doctrine of inevitable discovery. (R., pp.102-05.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Whitman and the State
agreed that he could enter a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled
substance and resisting or obstructing officers, reserving his right to appeal the district
court's ruling on his motion to suppress. (R., pp.111-14.) Pursuant to the agreement,
Mr. Whitman pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and resisting or
obstructing officers, and the remaining counts (one and four) were dismissed. (Plea.Tr.,
p.14, L.22-p.19, L.25; Sent.Tr., p.19, Ls.7-8.)
Mr. Whitman was sentenced to seven years, with three years fixed, on the
possession of a controlled substance charge, and a sentence of one year on the
resisting or obstructing an officer charge.

The district court suspended execution of

both sentences, and placed Mr. Whitman on probation for a period of four years.

than the Fourth Amendment. As such, no appeal can be taken on this basis. See
State v. Kofoed, 147 Idaho 296 (2009) and State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404 (1992).
3
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3

(Sent.Tr., p.18, L.5- p.19, L.12.) Mr. Whitman flied a Notice of Appeal timely from the
judgment of conviction. (R., p.134.)

4

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress
evidence found during a warrantless search of his vehicle?

2.

Is the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Davis v. United States
fatal to Mr. Whitman's Gant argument?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Whitman's Motion To Suppress Evidence
Found During A Search Of His Vehicle
A.

Introduction
Mr. Whitman asserts that the district court's denial of his motion to suppress

evidence found during the warrantless search of his vehicle was erroneous.
Specifically, the district court erred when it held that an exception to the Gant rule
applied and that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered. Both holdings
are unsupported by the record and the law.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Whitman's Motion To Suppress
Evidence Found During A Search Of His Vehicle
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

The burden of proof

rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995).

1.

The District Court Erred When It Found That An Exception To The Gant
Rule Applied

In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct 1710 (2009), the United States
Supreme Court clarified its case law, specifically, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
6

(1981 ), with respect to vehicle searches following the arrest of an occupant, ultimately
holding that police may "search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search." Gant at_, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. The Court also
announced an exception to this rule, specifically, "that circumstances unique to the
vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."'

Id.

(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part)). Finally, as relevant here, the Court announced another exception when "there is
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Id. at _,
129 S. Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)).
The district court rejected any argument that either Mr. Whitman or his passenger
was within reaching distance of the vehicle when it was searched.

(R., p.102.)

However, in denying Mr. Whitman's motion to suppress, the district court held that the
search was lawful under the exception for probable cause that evidence of a crime is in
the vehicle, specifically holding,
Trooper Bailey observed objective and articulable evidence that the
Defendant had a concealed weapon in the vehicle. The Defendant had
already lied when questioned about whether an additional occupant was in
the vehicle. Given the presence of the ammunition, the Defendant's
inclinations [sic] to make false representations, and the outstanding
warrant and accompanying warning that the passenger might be a risk
when apprehended, the officer had probable cause to believe that a
concealed weapon was in all likelihood located in the vehicle.
(R., pp.102-03.)
The district court cited to Idaho Code § 18-3302, what it classified as "the
concealed weapons probation" (R., p.105), in holding the police had probable cause to
believe that the crime of possessing a concealed weapon had been committed and that
7

evidence of that crime would "in all likelihood" be found in the vehicle. (R., pp.102-03.)
In fact, under Idaho law it is not unlawful to carry a concealed weapon within a vehicle
unless one is within the limits of a city.

See I.C. § 18-3302(9) ("While in any motor

vehicle, inside the limits or confines of any city, a person shall not carry a concealed
weapon on or about his person without a license to carry a concealed weapon.").
Furthermore, the State, which had the burden of proof of establishing an exception to
the warrant requirement, presented no testimony as to whether the traffic stop in this
case occurred within the limits of any city. (Supp.Tr., p.3, Ls.5-15; p.18, L.15 - p.21,

LB.)
Second, assuming, arguendo, that it was a crime to carry a concealed weapon in
a vehicle under the facts of this case, the district court cited to no case law to support its
finding that the presence of a bullet in plain view provided probable cause to believe
that a concealed weapon was in the vehicle. (R., pp.102-03.) An appellate court in at
least one other jurisdiction has held otherwise. See People v. Colyar, 941 N.E.2d 479
(Ill. App. Ct 2010), rev. allowed, 949 N.E.2d 1100 (2011) (police officer's observation of
bullet in plain view in center console of passenger compartment of vehicle did not
provide probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed).
Finally, in making its findings, the district court implied that the exception for a
search incident to arrest might also apply.

(R., p.102.) With respect to the search

incident to arrest exception, the evidence is clear that Mr. Whitman was not under arrest
at the time of the search, and that Trooper Bailey had not decided whether he was
going to cite or arrest Mr. Whitman for anything.
(Trooper Bailey so testifying).)

(Supp. Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.1 0

Furthermore, even assuming,

arguendo, that

Mr. Whitman had been under arrest for resisting or obstructing an officer at the time of

8

the search, there was no indication that the police were searching for evidence related
to that crime when they conducted the search.

2.

The District Court Erred When It Found That The Evidence Would
Inevitably Have Been Discovered

Under the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant requirement, evidence
found during an illegal search need not be suppressed if the State can establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that it would inevitably have been discovered through
lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). As the Idaho Court of Appeals
has noted,
The inevitable discovery doctrine was not intended to allow a court to
consider what actions the authorities should or could have taken and in
doing so then determine that lawful discovery of already unlawfully
obtained evidence would have been inevitable.

[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine was never intended to swallow the
exclusionary rule by substituting what the police should have done for
what they really did.
State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 916-17 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted).

In support of its argument that the inevitable discovery exception applied to the
evidence discovered in Mr. Whitman's vehicle, the State argued that "the evidence
would inevitably have been discovered when the Defendant was arrested and the
trooper conducted an inventory search of the vehicle he was driving pursuant to written
Idaho State Police policy." (R., p.66.)
In upholding the legality of the warrantless search on alternative grounds, the
district court accepted the State's argument that the evidence would inevitably have
been discovered, specifically holding that:

9

Officers had ample probable cause to suspect he [Mr. Whitman] had
committed crimes, and the officers had justification to take the Defendant
and his vehicle into custody. A subsequent search of the vehicle,
pursuant to the inventory procedures, would have yielded the same
evidence which the Defendant now seeks to suppress. Thus, the doctrine
of inevitable discovery applies in this instance, allowing the State to use
the evidence obtained in the warrantless vehicle search.
(R., p.105.)
The only crime for which the police might have had probable cause to arrest
Mr. Whitman prior to the search of his vehicle was resisting or obstructing an officer.
However, Mr. Whitman's actions in arguably lying to the police about whether there was
a passenger in his vehicle did not provide probable cause that he had violated Idaho
Code § 18-705. See State v. Brandstetter, 127 Idaho 885 (Ct. App. 1995) (where a
defendant makes a false response to a law enforcement officer's question that he was
not legally obligated to answer and such a "deliberate falsification was no more
obstructive than would have been his silence[,]" there could be no violation of I.C. § 18705). Additionally, Trooper Bailey clearly and unequivocally testified that he had not
decided whether he was going to cite Mr. Whitman (presumably for the purported traffic
infractions) or arrest him (presumably for obstructing or resisting) at the time that he
conducted the search of Mr. Whitman's vehicle. 4 (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.10.)
Given the facts of this case, and the limits of the inevitable discovery exception
set forth in Bunting, it cannot be said that the State showed, by a preponderance of the

4

In its order denying the motion to suppress, the district court noted, "The Defendant
also does not dispute whether Trooper Bailey had probable cause to take the Defendant
into custody prior to the search." (R., p.99.) To the extent that the district court's finding
implies that Mr. Whitman did not challenge the legality of his arrest, it is incorrect.
(R., p.78 (challenging the sufficiency of evidence that Mr. Whitman had committed a
crime prior to the warrantless search of his vehicle).)
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evidence, that the evidence found during the warrantless search of his vehicle would
inevitably have been discovered by lawful means.

11.
The United States Supreme Court's Recent Holding In Davis v. United States Is Not
Fatal To Mr. Whitman's Gant Argument
In Davis v. United States,

U.S.

131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011), 5 the United

States Supreme Court clarified the scope and effect of its decision in Gant. Specifically,
the Court held that the Gant rule does not apply to exclude evidence found in searches
that occurred prior to the issuance of its opinion when the police acted "in reasonable
reliance on binding precedent[.]" Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29. While this decision
might appear to be fatal to Mr. Whitman's Gant argument, he submits that it is not.
Unlike the facts in Davis, in which "all agree[d] that the officers' conduct was in
strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way[,]" Davis
at

, 131 S. Ct. at 2428, no such agreement is present here. In this case, the trooper

never explicitly testified as to the legal justification for his search, let alone cite to Belton
or its progeny as the basis for his search. (Supp.Tr., p.29, L.15

p.31, L.4.) For this

reason, Davis can be distinguished from the facts of this case.
In the alternative, if this Court finds that the record below was not fully developed
on this issue because Davis was not issued until after this case was appealed, this
Court should remand for further proceedings in light of Davis.

5

The Davis opinion was not released until after Mr. Whitman's case was appealed.
11

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Whitman respectfully requests that this
Court vacate his conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings.
th

DATED this 28 day of November,
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